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Abstract
Asset securitization has been identified as an alchemy that ‘really’ works. Asset
securitization yields a number of benefits to a financial system inter alia by reducing
overall interest rates, enhancing liquidity in the banking sector and reducing inter-
mediary costs. Yet, the recent global financial crisis (GFC) questioned the very
existence of asset securitization. However, post-GFC literature is not hesitant to
identify a list of causes that may have facilitated the GFC including subprime
lending, executive compensation, de-regulation, etc. Adopting a lexonomic
approach, this discussion deviates from the traditional approach by focusing on
identifying political and institutional factors behind the GFC. This chapter will
investigate U.S political economic decision and then U.S institutional setup that may
have facilitated the stage for a GFC.
Keywords: asset-securitization, global financial crisis, asset-backed-securities
1. Introduction
This chapter provides a contextual background to those that follow by describ-
ing the GFC and its salient characteristics, and identifying salient causes of the
crisis. Once these salient causes have been identified, the thesis proceeds to investi-
gate the extent of the role, if any, that economics and political mechanisms under-
lying securitization may have had in facilitating the GFC. Financial economists
generally trace the beginnings of the GFC to approximately mid-2007, when a
number of key mortgage lenders specialising in sub-prime housing loans experi-
enced financial distress. For a number of reasons, banks and other mortgage origi-
nators had, in the years preceding the GFC, been able to lend home loans to low-
to-mid-income borrowers1 This practice, and the securitization arrangements based
on it, would generally not have proved problematic if house prices throughout the
United States had continued to appreciate as they had under speculative boom
conditions. Problems arose, however, when the U.S. housing boom burst in 2006,
and particularly in residential areas housing concentrations of ‘sub-prime’
borrowers.
1 Often referred as subprime borrowers who, under normal lending criteria, would have been refused
loans (eg. because of poor credit histories).
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As investors became increasingly reluctant to invest in securities based on sub-
prime housing mortgages, this financial distress spread to securitizers of a sub-
prime mortgage loans, and was further exacerbated when credit rating agencies
such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch downgraded many mortgage-backed
securities. In the words of Allen and Carletti, the mortgage-backed sub-prime home
loan securitization market ‘simply broke down’ [1] and a general loss of confidence
became more widespread, affecting commercial asset-backed securitization mar-
kets in the latter half of 2007. Banks sponsoring many residential and commercial
securitizers were required, under the terms of cross-guarantee arrangements, to
pay debts that otherwise would have remained off-balance-sheet as contingent
liabilities [2].
Institutional and corporate investors internationally had also purchased securi-
tization products, adding to the linkages between large financial institutions in
different jurisdictions. At about the same time, other banks in the United States,
Britain and elsewhere in Europe—themselves uncertain about the extent to which
they might be called to make unexpectedly large payments from their reserves
under their own cross-guarantee arrangements with related securitizers and other
companies—became reluctant to provide any more than very short term liquidity
(of more than a few days’ tenor) to each other. Institutional investors engaged in a
‘flight to quality’, investing in highly liquid, secure assets such as Treasury bills and
other government securities. In approximately March 2008, company reports of
further bad debts and asset write-downs because of mark-to-market accounting
increased uncertainty about counterparty risk levels, with the result that global
investment bank Bear Stearns Companies Inc. was unable to secure wholesale
funding to continue its operations past mid-March, when it was sold to JP Morgan
Chase & Co. for approximately 7% of its pre-crisis equity value [3].
Internationally, central banks in consultation with their governments intervened
in their respective economies by markedly reducing official or cash rates; injecting
liquidity into the system by effectively lending to primary dealers (e.g. by allowing
them to swap less liquid asset-backed securities for Treasury securities, often at a
substantial discount); and so-called government ‘bailouts’ of securitizing institu-
tions perceived to be economically significant or ‘too big to fail’ (such as Northern
Rock in Britain; and Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S.) [4, 5].2
In subsequent months, real economies in the United States, Britain and elsewhere in
Europe have exhibited historically poor performance, with relatively high unem-
ployment and low economic growth, despite relatively low interest rates and
inflation.
Abstracting somewhat from this background, the GFC’s chief characteristics as
identified in the literature can be clustered around excessive system liquidity; high
levels of executive compensation by community standards; high levels of financial
innovation; banks and other financial intermediaries undertaking activities beyond
2 A number of high-profile investment bank securitizers requested government support, including Bear
Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. Of these, Bear Stearns, Merrill
Lynch and Wachovia were ultimately sold at well below their year high equity prices, while Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley ultimately became commercial bank holding companies, subject to prudential
regulation but able to access Federal Reserve swaps into liquid assets at substantially discounted prices.
Another high-profile securitizer, Lehman Brothers, went into involuntary liquidation. American
International Group (AIG), a global insurer and sub-insurer which had ultimately insured many of the
securitization schemes affected by collapsing asset prices, was saved from liquidation by a U.S. Federal
Reserve Bank ‘rescue package’ that enabled AIG to deliver additional collateral to its credit default swap
trading partners
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their traditional roles; speculative asset bubbles; and the U.S. sub-prime crisis and
the fallout resulting from it [6, 7].
This chapter looks into the main causes of the crisis, while developing a discus-
sion on the contribution of each individual factor for the onset of the financial crisis.
The chapter finds that GFC 2007 is a result of a number of factors. Some factors are
linked with political decisions dated decades back in U.S political agenda, while
some factors are market driven. The structure of the chapter is as fallows. Section 2
is a brief discussion on history of financial crisis in the modern world. Section 3, the
main section of the chapter is a discussion on GFC 2007, with a special emphasis on
housing bubble. This section glances over a number of contributory factors to the
GFC including inter alia economical, financial, legal and behavioural factors that
may have contributed to the onset of the crisis.
2. Speculative asset bubbles in modern financial history
Although examples of speculative bubbles are recorded in ancient times, in more
recent times the most commonly cited early example of a speculative asset bubble is
the Tulip Bubble in the 1600s. Tulips imported from East to Holland in the 1600s
became a collector’s item, and tulip bulbs were sold as very high prices. An influx of
speculative funds was accompanied by a surge in financial innovation until the
bubble burst in 1673, and many who had purchased bulbs on credit went bankrupt,
precipitating an economic depression all over the country [8, 9].
A second commonly cited speculative bubble in early modern financial history
was the collapse of the South Sea Company, reported in England in 1720. The South
Sea Company was a joint stock company, which was awarded a Royal Charter
(monopoly rights) to trade in North and South America, and became the subject of
massive speculation throughout Europe. The company’s share price, recorded at
£128 in January 1720, increased almost tenfold to £1000 over the next 6 months to
July 1720. By the end of 1720 following a bursting of the bubble, however, it had
reverted to £124 per share [10].
It was in early 1920s that the Florida real estate bubble burst. However the
ability to purchase real estate with a down payment of 10% provided the leverage to
the asset bubble. Accordingly house prices went up grabbing more peculators in to
the business. The bubble burst in advance with a typhoon hitting Florida causing
massive property damage. The sudden drop in prices paved the way for bankrupt-
cies and default. The Great depression, the most longest, widespread, and deepest
depression of the 20th century took place after the stock market crash of October
29, 1929. The speculative asset bubble started to grow in late 1920s’ with the boom
in many industries3 resulting stock market speculation and paving way for thou-
sands of investors to invest in the stock market, were as most of the investors have
borrowed the money for investments. The asset bubble rose to such a high extent
that the lenders have given loans up to three times of the face value of the stocks
investors have purchased. Expecting stock prices to raise more, more and more
funds were invested in the stock market creating a massive asset bubble by 1929. At
the end with the dropping commodity prices the stock prices began to fall. By
October 29, panic selling started and the stock market collapsed, leading to the
longest depression in the world history [11–14].
The ‘Tronics’ burst took place in 1961 with emergence of electronics in the
market. A number of investors were keen on investing shares belonging to
3 steel production, building, automobiles etc.
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companies dealing with electronics. With the bubble burst in 1962, the share prices
went down significantly. A speculative asset bubble, similar to the bubble in 1920s,
took place in US by 1984. The speculative asset bubble was believed to be built on
leverage and loose government economic policy. Similar to the event took place in
1920s. Junk bonds were the financial innovation of the day. The debts of less
creditworthy companies were used as a tool to purchasing companies. Program
trading and stock index futures were the other financial innovations. The Bubble
peaked in October of 1987 followed by a stock market crash in a in a single day.
Even though the public expectation was an economic depression, with the federal
guarantee that they would guarantee the credit of market makers the recession
never took place [15, 16].
In 2007 the housing prices in US believed to have grown more than 100%,
within a decade’s time. These bubble in house prices paved the way for house
owners to refinance their houses at a lower rate and further to gain a second
mortgage with backed by the price appreciation. Backed by large investment banks,
small banks funded brokers by buying loans for the mortgage broker. Lending to
the subprime market was significant by the time, enhancing the housing bubble.
Compared to 2006 the housing prices declined 20% by September 2008. Leading
borrowers to default. Douglas et al. (2012) identifies the 2007-8 Global financial
crisis had resulted in significant negative impact all over the world, while
making policy makes re-consider the fact that they can or should manage such
asset bubbles [5–7].
Humans never seems to learn from their mistakes as greed becomes the promi-
nent decision making factor for the human-financial decision making.4 The main
factor that distinguish GFC from the rest of the crises is the fact that DFC 2007 is
based on a housing bubble. Yet, ironically all financial crises are based on some sort
of an asset. In 1600s it was the Tulip Bubble. In South Sea bubble it was company
stocks. Again in dot.com bubble it was company stocks. In each occasion a financial
asset accumulates its price creating a bubble, which breakouts suddenly with
changes in surrounding economic factors. Hence at a glance the GCF is quite
unique, since it developed on real estate prices. Yet, a deep analysis revels that
underling mechanism of the GFC is no difference to the rest.
3. The global financial crisis (GFC)
Financial economists generally trace the beginnings of the GFC to approximately
mid-2007, when a number of key mortgage lenders specialising in sub-prime hous-
ing loans experienced financial distress. For a number of reasons set out below,
banks and other mortgage originators had, in the years preceding the GFC, been
able to lend home loans to low-to-mid-income borrowers who, under normal lend-
ing criteria, would have been refused loans (e.g. because of poor credit histories).
This practice, and the securitization arrangements based on it, would generally not
have proved problematic if house prices throughout the United States had contin-
ued to appreciate as they had under speculative boom conditions. Problems arose,
however, when the U.S. housing boom burst in 2006, and particularly in residential
areas housing concentrations of ‘sub-prime’ borrowers [5, 6, 17].
4 See in general the discussion developed based on the concept ‘casino capitalism’ in Keynes’s General
theory [58].
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As investors became increasingly reluctant to invest in securities based on
sub-prime housing mortgages, this financial distress spread to securitizers of a
sub-prime mortgage loans, and was further exacerbated when credit rating agencies
such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch downgraded many mortgage-backed
securities. In the words of Allen and Carletti, the mortgage-backed sub-prime
home loan securitization market ‘simply broke down’ and a general loss of confi-
dence became more widespread, affecting commercial asset-backed securitization
markets in the latter half of 2007. Banks sponsoring many residential and commer-
cial securitizers were required, under the terms of cross-guarantee arrangements, to
pay debts that otherwise would have remained off-balance-sheet as contingent
liabilities [6, 17].
Institutional and corporate investors internationally had also purchased securi-
tization products, adding to the linkages between large financial institutions in
different jurisdictions. At about the same time, other banks in the United States,
Britain and elsewhere in Europe—themselves uncertain about the extent to which
they might be called to make unexpectedly large payments from their reserves
under their own cross-guarantee arrangements with related securitizers and other
companies—became reluctant to provide any more than very short term liquidity
(of more than a few days’ tenor) to each other. Institutional investors engaged in a
‘flight to quality’, investing in highly liquid, secure assets such as Treasury bills and
other government securities. In approximately March 2008, company reports of
further bad debts and asset write-downs because of mark-to-market accounting
increased uncertainty about counterparty risk levels, with the result that global
investment bank Bear Stearns Companies Inc. was unable to secure wholesale
funding to continue its operations past mid-March, when it was sold to JP Morgan
Chase & Co. for approximately 7% of its pre-crisis equity value [2, 18].
Internationally, central banks in consultation with their governments intervened
in their respective economies by markedly reducing official or cash rates; injecting
liquidity into the system by effectively lending to primary dealers (e.g. by allowing
them to swap less liquid asset-backed securities for Treasury securities, often at a
substantial discount); and so-called government ‘bailouts’ of securitizing institu-
tions perceived to be economically significant or ‘too big to fail’ (such as Northern
Rock in Britain; and Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S.).5 In
subsequent months, real economies in the United States, Britain and elsewhere in
Europe have exhibited historically poor performance, with relatively high unem-
ployment and low economic growth, despite relatively low interest rates and infla-
tion [20].
Abstracting somewhat from this background, the GFC’s chief characteristics as
identified in the literature can be clustered around excessive system liquidity; high
levels of executive compensation by community standards; high levels of financial
innovation; banks and other financial intermediaries undertaking activities beyond
their traditional roles; speculative asset bubbles; and the U.S. sub-prime crisis and
the fallout resulting from it.
5 A number of high-profile investment bank securitizers requested government support, including Bear
Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. Of these, Bear Stearns, Merrill
Lynch and Wachovia were ultimately sold at well below their year high equity prices, while Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley ultimately became commercial bank holding companies, subject to prudential
regulation but able to access Federal Reserve swaps into liquid assets at substantially discounted prices.
Another high-profile securitizer, Lehman Brothers, went into involuntary liquidation [19].
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3.1 Law creates incentives
Even though each crisis has some link with the then legal system, GFC is quite
unique with the fact that a number of deliberate legal provisions in U.S played an
identifiable role is setting the stage for the crisis. Following is a brief discussion on
the incentives created by legal provisions in the onset of the GFC.
Law and legal regulation create incentives and disincentives for market partici-
pants to behave in particular ways. For example, it was foreshadowed in 2002, in
the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom collapses, that the then-new corporate
law reforms United States would be insufficient to control financial conglomerates’
perverse incentives for risk-taking, particularly given problems of moral hazard,
conflicts of interest, and the incentive of management of distressed institutions to
postpone asset write-downs in the hope that their company’s financial position
might improve before the next disclosure to the investing public [22].
Moreover, market participants respond strategically to these incentives and
disincentives, generally optimising utility within the constraints inter alia of
bounded rationality and market imperfections (e.g. time leads and lags, asymmetric
information, or transactions costs). If the law puts in place economic incentives for
financial institutions and companies to take on high levels of risk (e.g. through
complex financial innovations such as loan securitizations in a rising asset market)
and to circumvent relevant legislation and regulation that is in place (e.g. by
siphoning funds through offshore entities, or by entering credit default swaps)6, it
is hardly surprising if institutions and companies act on those economic incentives.
Moreover, if the incentives created by legislation turn out to be perverse with
unintended consequences, then at least some of the responsibility must lie with the
legislature, rather than the institutions or companies [23, 24, 26].
Changes in the law can empower and disempower vested interests, with each
strategic response to the incentives created having costs and benefits for the
affected parties. This empowerment and disempowerment, with its attendant costs
and benefits, creates winners and losers. Welfare economics investigates not only
how to optimise resource allocation for given distributions of income across mar-
kets, but the effects of different resource distributions on these winners and losers,
and on society generally. One of the ways in which market participants seek to
ensure that they become ‘winners’ out of legislative change, rather than ‘losers’, is
to (legally) circumvent any proscriptions or restrictions on their behaviour [27].
3.2 Uncertainty, information asymmetry, complexity and ‘sophisticated’
investors
Innovation is, by its nature, often risky. Financial innovation, in the form of
asset-backed securities issued under securitization schemes, largely facilitated much
of the indirect investment by domestic and overseas institutions in U.S. housing
assets [27]. As had conventionally been the case, the purpose of much of this
financial innovation was to minimise risk and enhance expected returns by
6 For example, credit default swaps were outside the ambit of the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act
2000 (U.S.) and the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (U.S.), with the result that they operated beyond the
purview of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and, in practice (if not in strict law) the
Securities Exchange Commission. Moreover, credit default swaps were specifically excluded from State-
based insurance legislation. The justification for credit default swaps lying outside these legislative
regimes was that the users of these swaps are institutional (presumably sophisticated) investors, rather
than (for example) uninformed consumers [25].
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reducing bank funding costs, differentiating fundamentally similar products,7 and
for balance sheet management purposes. In addition however, much of this inno-
vation—in particular, securitization contacts themselves and credit default swaps,
which were designed to compensate investors when security issuers defaulted—was
designed to transfer credit risk and liquidity risk [4, 5]. Almost by definition,
financial innovation implies risk and uncertainty. In general, financial markets can
ex ante cope with both. For example, risk can be hedged using derivatives; uncer-
tainty can be mitigated using insurance. While neither mechanism can prevent
losses occurring ex post, they do alleviate the ex ante concerns of risk-averse or
uncertainty-averse borrowers and investors [28]. Even in an historical point of
view, innovative financial instruments are closely associated with asset bubbles. For
example the tulip bubble itself is a creative innovation of the day. Yet, not neces-
sarily innovation should be a part of a crisis. The Great Depression associate no
financial innovation, but common company stocks.
The transfer of risk and uncertainty downstream is cet. par. effective if markets
are complete. For example, even if no sub-assignees can be found for a particular
securitization asset, financial institutions can readily—at a price—re-bundle the
asset into a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) for which counterparties
can be found. Alternatively, if no sub-insurers can be found for the securitization
asset, financial institutions can readily—again, at a price—re-bundle derivatives
to replicate insurance (analogous to so-called ‘portfolio insurance’ in funds
management) [29, 30].
Problems arise if markets are incomplete8—for example, if an institution wish-
ing to sell a particular securitised asset is unable to find a buyer for it, either directly
or indirectly. Thus if, in the examples noted earlier, no sub-assignees can be found
even for the synthetic CDO, or no investors can be found to participate in the
proposed ‘insurance replication’ then—as with any financial assets that are available
for sale but for which no buyer can be found—three consequences follow. First, the
risk will not be able to be transferred, since no contract counterparty can be found.
This affects who, in the event of significant default or insolvency, is likely to be
default losses in respect of the securitised asset. Second, the lack of buyer demand
would generally imply price falls for the securitised asset (ultimately to zero).
This highlights the importance of the role of ‘market makers’ in financial mar-
kets. Market makers are so-called because they have sufficient clientele on the buy
and sell sides of a trade that they are willing to accept the risk of holding a stock of
securities to help facilitate trading (buying and selling) in those securities. All of the
high profile investment banks, noted earlier, that experienced distress in the sub-
prime crisis were market makers. If even market makers cannot find buyers for
securitised assets and there no buyer demand in the market generally, then the
resultant price falls (ultimately to zero) for the securitised asset represents very
substantial price risk for upstream investors. As with all products, innovation
implies risk.
7 In terms of market structure, banking and investment is characterised by an oligopoly of large firms
(eg. market-makers) with a competitive fringe of small firms. The type of product differentiation that
occurred with securitisation is consistent with oligopoly theory.
8 Strictly an economic theory, an incomplete market means a market in which, under certain conditions,
the number of state-contingent claims (securities) is less than the number of states of nature. While a
wide array of contingent claims is regularly traded against many states of nature (in the form of futures,
options, collars, swaps and various types of insurance), the set of outcomes in nature plainly exceeds the
set of claims available in the markets, implying that financial markets remain incomplete in spite of
impressive innovation in recent times [31].
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3.2.1 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is associated with any financial bubble. Financial crises since the
1660s were driven by uncertainty associated with future prices of a particular asset.
The GFC was claimed to be a unique event—as the Turner Review in the UK
described it, ‘the worst financial crisis for a century’—which suggests uncertainty as
distinct from risk simpliciter. Risk in financial markets is distinguishable from
uncertainty on the basis that, while risk can be measured objectively, uncertainty
cannot [32, 33]. Thus, by definition, risk is measurable, and can be expressed ex ante
as a probability or a statistical coefficient. This makes it amenable to financial
engineering techniques which utilise average returns, statistical variances and co-
variances which can be used to help manage risk [34, 35].
In contrast, by definition uncertainty cannot be measured quantitatively, mean-
ing that advances in financial engineering over recent decades are of limited help
for companies and boards faced with considerable uncertainty. And as Professor
Knight pointed out as early as 1921, the problem with commercial life—and in this
context, with evaluating corporate insolvency in particular, is not business risk per
se, but the fact that any ex ante judgments about uncertainty are themselves fraught
with uncertainty [33].
Uncertainty is broadly characterised in economic theory as either exogenous or
endogenous uncertainty. Exogenous uncertainty relates to factors that are exogenous
to an institution or company and beyond directors’ and management’s control, such
as the economy falling into recession, the effects of the GFC, or the impact of
unanticipated legislative change.9 This is, at its heart, a rationale for the ‘business
judgement’ rule in corporate law.10 No economic system can reduce or eliminate
exogenous uncertainty. Its adverse impacts on companies can, however, be miti-
gated by appropriate insurance11, provided there is insurance to cover the particular
uncertainty (a requirement that is by no means always met in incomplete, ‘real
world’markets). If there is not, the directors and company management are gener-
ally forced to recognise the source of the exogenous uncertainty—assuming they are
aware of it—as a constraint on its decision-making, and simply do the best they can
in the circumstances, ‘in the interests of the company as a whole’.
In contrast, endogenous uncertainty results from stakeholders’ decisions. Exam-
ples might include uncertainty about whether and how much bank debt will be
rolled over in the face of successive monthly defaults that have breached interest
cover and debt covenants; or uncertainty about whether secured creditors will
appoint a receiver in these circumstances. Endogenous uncertainty can be reduced
to some degree by company management who are prepared to incur the search costs
9 The law itself may also generate uncertainty. For example, the uncertainty resulting from the
conflicting incentives in the Australian Corporations Act to, on the one hand, continuously disclose
reasonable suspicions of insolvency while, on the other hand, simultaneously continuing to try to trade
out of difficulty, is itself a prime example.
10 See for example, Section 180 of the Corporations Act (Cth) in Australia; and in a U.S. context, Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984); and Puma v. Marriott, Del. Ch., 283 A.2d 693, 695 (1971). In concept
(though not in law), the business judgement rule could possibly have been used to defend the securitizer
in the recent Australian Federal court case ofWingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia (in
Liq.) [2012] FCA1028. The Applicant’s case was based, however, on allegations of misleading or
deceptive conduct, for which the business judgement rule has no application as a defence. This is
presumably why the Applicant’s lawyers brought the case in those terms, rather than on the basis of a
breach of duty of care having caused Council losses.
11 For example, mortgage insurance in a securitization.
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necessary to make more informed decisions, or otherwise decide—since it is within
their control—to do something about it. In the face of investor and market igno-
rance, introducing a high level of complexity into securitized financial products and
transactions can amplify the effects of (largely endogenous) uncertainty.12
It is important to distinguish between exogenous and endogenous uncertainty if
there is any possibility of apportioning any legal culpability (liability) to the various
stakeholders in a securitization. There is plainly more scope for using the exogenous
uncertainty resulting from the GFC (for example) as the basis of an argument to
defend financial institutions’ and companies’ behaviour in unique, highly uncertain
times; and less scope for doing so on the basis of any endogenous uncertainty
created as a result of their own decisions. In that regard, financial institutions and
companies could be argued to be ‘the authors of their own misfortune’.13
3.2.2 Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry relates to the fact that different people have different
knowledge about the same thing. For example, the borrower buying mortgage
insurance typically knows more about her ability to repay her housing loan than the
insurance company. She also knows more about the risks of lending to her than the
lender. Financial market participants have incentives to create information
asymmetries, in order to increase their bargaining power when negotiating on
contracts [36]. Information asymmetries can also lead to weak (or ultimately non-
existent) markets—even in financial market products [37].
For example, when negotiating for the transfer of risks in securitization schemes
with downstream parties, the transferor typically knows more about those risks
than the transferee. In any chain of risky asset sales one after another, upstream
bidders will expect this, so that part of the benefit of winning ‘earlier’ contracts is
the information rent that becomes valuable when later on-selling. Yet if those risks
have been transferred downstream a sufficient number of times, potential trans-
ferees may become wary of purchasing (taking on the risk), knowing that they
might be successful only if they bid too high a price.14 Realising that they are more
likely to outbid other, more informed bidders only if they bid too much for the
contract, uninformed bidders may deliberately under-bid, or not bid at all. If they
do not bid enough, the seller will refrain from selling, choosing instead to bear the
risk itself.
In this way, the ability to transfer risk downstream may diminish (or even
cease), the further downstream the risk has been transferred already. The down-
stream party who is left bearing the risk may have ‘won’ the contract, but informa-
tion asymmetries may well have led to a ‘winners’ curse’, in which the bidders for
securitized products were successful simply because they had bid too much [38].
This may arguably be what happened in the months preceding the GFC, when
banks refused to roll over debt facilities for AIG and other large U.S. corporates.
12 Much of the Federal Government’s Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry into Financial Products and
Services in Australia (November 2009) was fundamentally concerned with these types of problems: see
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (Nov 2009), Inquiry into
Financial Products and Services in Australia, Australian Government, Canberra.
13 Cf. The judgement of the Full Bench of the Australian High Court case ofWynbergen v Hoyts
Corporation (1997) 149 ALR 25, per Hayne J. at p. 30. See also (1997) 72 ALJR 65; or [1997] HCA 52.
14 That is, the price may be ‘too high’ either in the sense that it over-compensates for the level of risk, or
(perhaps more likely) in the sense that the bidder still gains, but not by as much as originally anticipated.
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3.2.3 Complexity
The GFC is quite unique with the fact that financial innovation of the day (Asset
backed securities, Credit default swaps, etc.) are overly complex compared to
financial assets associated with previous asset bubbles. In some cases, because of the
complexity of the new products, senior management in financial institutions and
companies understood little of the investment risks.15 As Prof. Schwarcz has
pointed out, this complexity in financial products did not arise for its own sake, nor
did it (necessarily) arise from an intention to obfuscate. It arose in response to
investor demands for mechanisms that facilitate the transfer and trading of risk,
and for higher risk-adjusted returns [39, 40]. Even if all information about complex
securitization structures were fully disclosed to investors, the level of complexity
would cet. par. have increased the volume of information necessary to understand
the investment with certainty. If potential investors (or their agents) with limited
time perceived the costs of reading and understanding that complexity to outweigh
the incremental benefit, they would have had incentive to resort to simplifying
heuristics, such as credit ratings, as substitutes for fully understanding the risks
[39];16 or simply, at a price, outsource (transfer) the risk by engaging an insurer or
credit default swap counterparty. Prof. Stiglitz has articulated this argument fur-
ther, highlighting how the complexity of financial products created by U.S. banks
and institutions increased both risk and information asymmetries [21, 41].
Moreover, complexity can have distributional effects. Because of information
asymmetry and agency costs17 which are spread across an interconnected network
of contracts both inside and outside the firm, financial intermediaries can extract
rents for, and transfer wealth to, themselves by increasing the complexity of new
securities and products they issue. As will be seen, there were plainly incentives for
rent extraction and wealth transfers in many securitization schemes.
3.3 Suboptimal contracting
In economic terms, a contract is incomplete when it does not specify all parties’
rights and responsibilities in every possible situation. More technically, the contract
is insufficiently state-contingent, meaning that its terms, whether express (written
or oral) or implied, do not cover all of the parties’ rights and responsibilities for all
of the contingencies that affect the parties [42].
Frequently, though not always,18 this is due to transactions costs. For example,
the ex-ante costs of specifying a particular (e.g. remote) contingency in the contract
—or equivalently, every possible contingency in the contract—may exceed the ex-
ante gains from doing so. It may also be because the parties cannot foresee all of the
15 Cf. the Australian Federal Court case ofWingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia (in
Liq.) [2012] FCA 1028, in which the Court pointed out that, rather than the documentation surrounding
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) being too complex, the securitizer’s liability was grounded in
evidence that they failed to provide an adequate explanation of the potential investment risks (eg. from
the GFC) to their client Councils. The decision is currently on appeal.
16 Credit rating agencies’methods of rating structured products such as securitisations are imprecise,
subject to errors in data, errors in assumptions and errors in modelling. Further, credit rating agencies do
not perform due diligence on the loans underlying securitizations [40].
17 See below.
18 For example, a contract may be incomplete because one party has private information about factors
that affect the payoff between the parties, and chooses not to share this information with the other
contracting parties [43].
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contingencies that arise during the course of the contract which affect their
welfare [44].19
Possibly, the parties to the various contracts comprising securitizations prior to
the GFC could not foresee the possibility that underlying asset prices might not
continue to rise, but must—at least at some stage—level off or fall. It is probably
more likely, however, that the agents for these contracting parties simply perceived
the ex-ante costs of specifying the various payoffs in the event of underlying asset
price falls to exceed the ex-ante benefits—particularly if, as a result of their own
separate contracting or other legal arrangements,20 their own assets were protected
from litigation risk by downstream parties who would ultimately lose money when
the contingency eventuated.
If the contract is insufficiently state-contingent because of asymmetric informa-
tion (either between the contracting parties inter se, or between the contracting
parties and external decision-makers such as regulators), moral hazard or adverse
selection may be possible.21 Moral hazard can occur when contractual incomplete-
ness creates incentives for agents to act in their own self-interest at the expense of
others, so that they do not bear the full consequences of their actions. In the
securitization context, for example, where the quality of the underlying investment
may be difficult to ascertain because it is packaged jointly with other investments, it
could be optimal for a securitizer, who knows the quality of the underlying invest-
ments in the asset pool, to seek to guarantee performance to institutional investors
by contracting with a mortgage insurer.22 Once mortgage insurance is in place,
however, the insurance creates a moral hazard problem for the securitizer (or its
fund manager), who may no longer manage its asset portfolio with sufficient care
and diligence [6, 7].
Another example of moral hazard arises where securitizers and other
contracting parties either transfer the risks downstream (e.g. by assigning their
rights to another party in exchange for consideration), or enter into credit default
swaps as a form of ‘insurance’ against potential defaults. In either case, a moral
hazard problem may be created insofar as the transfer of risk induces the trans-
ferors in the securitization chain to cet. par. undertake riskier investments or con-
tinue to undertake highly risky activities. A similar incentive arises if downstream
parties purchase on a ‘non-recourse’ or ‘limited recourse’ basis back to upstream
parties.
A similar argument applies to the various contracting parties to the extent that
they have limited liability. In the event of insolvency, the limited liability of the
securitizer and the other contracting parties in the securitization chain cet. par.
effectively insures these parties against losses that accrue from highly variable
market conditions (limiting downside risk), without limiting potential gains. This
creates a moral hazard problem insofar as it induces securitizers and others in the
securitization chain to cet. par. undertake riskier investments.
19 A third possible explanation for contractual incompleteness, though one arguably less relevant in the
current context, is that the contracting parties are boundedly rational.
20 For example, the use of family discretionary trusts; or having key assets in their spouses’ or other
entities’ names.
21 For the sake of completeness, if the contract related only to trade but not investment, and the parties
expected that uncertainty could only be resolved in an efficient way ex post, then they could specify an
option to renegotiate the contract as a means of achieving efficient outcomes ex post [45] In the current
context, securitisation contracts involve investment as well as trade, so agreeing to renegotiate (e.g. in
the event of an underlying asset price collapse) is generally not a practical alternative.
22 This also serves to signal ‘safety’ to investors.
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3.3.1 Adverse selection
In any market in which products of different quality are traded, and only sellers
know the quality of the products they sell (i.e. there is asymmetric information
between buyers and sellers), poor quality products will always be sold with good
quality products unless there is some device to buyers to distinguish the good from
the bad. In such circumstances, the poor quality products are as likely to be pur-
chased as the good quality products—an outcome of adverse selection.
In an insurance context, those with the greatest risk of loss cet. par. have a
greater incentive to take out insurance against that loss. Because the applicant for
the insurance knows the risks of insuring him better than the insurer, the insurer is
unable to adjust the insurance premium accurately to reflect the true level of risk.
This gives the insurer an incentive to, among other things, sub-insure to another
(downstream) insurer, effectively transferring the risk to the latter at a price.
In a securitisation context, those originators and securitizers with the greatest
risk of loss cet. par. had the greatest incentive to ‘insure’ against that loss either
through mortgage insurance, transferring the risk by equitably assigning their
rights to downstream investors, ‘non-recourse’ or ‘limited recourse’ clauses, or
credit default swaps. Likewise, mortgage insurers have similar incentives to sub-
insure downstream. Provided markets were sufficiently complete and underlying
asset prices continued to rise, these strategies were effective. They ceased to be
effective when U.S. house prices collapsed and buyers who are willing to bear the
risk of losses could no longer be found.
3.4 Lack of accountability and the role of ethics
Put simply, markets and societies in which participants can trust each other
because each observes shared ethical norms run more smoothly and efficiently than
markets and societies that do not. In economic terms, markets and societies func-
tion more efficiently and effectively in the long run if all participants share the same
or sufficiently similar ethical norms and values. Problems arise because some indi-
viduals and firms operating within markets and societies are able to profit, some-
times hugely, in the short run by engaging in unethical conduct. Since the long run
is an accumulation of short runs, individuals and firms who engage in unethical
behaviour may survive longer than expected. While it is true that transparency and
publicity about the unethical conduct may impair their reputations and result in
lower profits, this is by no means guaranteed [46, 47].
Nevertheless, in practice, ethical norms exist as dimensions to financial decision-
making. They may sometimes be ignored, but they exist nevertheless. The efficient
functioning of markets takes place within the context of the law, which is predi-
cated on an axiology of ethical values such as investor protection, the unfairness of
insider trading, and the like. In this sense, law is moral philosophy or ethics in
action.23 Similarly, the regulation of financial markets, firms and institutions is
based in the ethical values of the relevant society.
Finance theory cannot escape the relevance of ethics, since many propositions in
finance are inherently both positive and normative. For example, the idea that
23 Having said this, the law is at best a very limited vehicle for ensuring ethical behaviour, for two main
reasons. First, lawmaking is generally slow and tends to be reactive in its attempts to solve a social
problem. Second, the law cannot be made to cover every ‘bad’ situation, because it is not possible to
predict and outlaw all situations that give rise to ‘bad’ conduct. Thus, while Birks is correct in asserting
that law is moral philosophy or ethics in action, mere compliance with the letter of the law may result in
very minimalist ethics in action.
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securitizations permit risk transfers, at a price, to downstream parties, has norma-
tive (as well as positive) implications if the price paid does not reflect the invest-
ment risks. Alternatively, in the context of the GFC, it is natural for people to have
some sympathy, based on grounds of morality, for stakeholders whose wealth has
been expropriated in—for example—Ponzi schemes or securitization issues that
generate wealth transfers between classes of security holders. Likewise, if contagion
does spread between firms, markets and even countries, it is natural for people to
feel that it is somehow unfair or inequitable for others to be adversely affected
through no fault of their own [48].
As suggested by the term ‘moral hazard’, the government bailouts of financially
distressed corporations considered ‘too big to fail’ havemoral implications, not only for
the taxpayers who ultimately fund them but the corporations who are their beneficia-
ries.24 Similarly, financiers’ exploitation of information asymmetries between bankers
and small investors through the use of confusing terms such as ‘negative equity’ and
‘bridging equity’ in prospectuses has ethical implications for both.
In economics, from which finance theory is in part derived, ethics is normally
treated as a ‘given’, determined with reference to societal norms; and behaviour in
firms and markets can be optimised within the bounds imposed by ethical and other
constraints, using second best principles if appropriate. Likewise, financial maxima
and optima can be discussed only for a given distribution of wealth between relevant
parties: investor wealth can be maximised, but only subject to a ‘given’ constraint
determined by the ethical norms of the society in which the firm operates [7, 50].
By way of example, consider the ethical implications of a manager in a financial
institution who issues securitized notes that generate wealth transfers between
classes of security holders. Assuming ethical behaviour is viewed as good for its own
sake, there is a good argument (based on efficiency as much as equity or fairness)
that the manager as agent should formulate business and financing policies first
with reference to his ethical responsibilities and only secondarily with reference to
investor (principal) wealth. Investor wealth could still be maximised, but only
subject to a ‘given’ constraint determined by the ethical norms of the society in
which the principal institution or corporation operates. By extension, the distribu-
tion of wealth between the institution’s various stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, debt
holders and management) could still be determined by equilibrium values of bond-
ing costs, monitoring costs and residual loss, but only subject to a similar ‘given’
ethical constraint, at the limit determined by society (e.g. through regulation and
norms of ‘acceptable’ behaviour).25
24 For example, in the context of the AIG bailout by the U.S. Government, Prof. Crotty points to the
actions of U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, who authorised an investment of $180 billion to
protect the value of U.S. corporations who would reportedly have incurred significant losses on
derivative and securitization contracts if AIG had been wound up. In the process, Goldman Sachs—of
whom Henry Paulson was formerly a Chief Executive—received $12.9 billion. According to Crotty,
Paulson must have known that Goldman Sachs would receive billions as a result of his decision, reflecting
“moral hazard of the highest order” [49].
25 As Prof. Little points out, it is such distributional questions that are often the important ones. Yet
there is no principle of morality or justice per se that determines how much, on average, members of
particular groups should receive. A distributional judgement must be made. The question in practice,
these days often asked by post-modernists, is “By whom?” In a democracy, there is no general way of
resolving this. Prof. Little argues that pluralism in modern democracies is a given, and every case must be
decided on its merits. Plainly Arrow’s impossibility theorem continues to be of relevance to such
distributional issues, notwithstanding the reluctance of some who, like Plato, regard it as perhaps
accurate but ultimately not very helpful [50].
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3.5 Overconfidence and domestic systemic risk
As Keynes pointed out, economists—let alone practical people in business—tend
to assume that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, unless there are
specific reasons to expect a change [51].26
In the years immediately preceding the sub-prime crisis, there was a widespread
belief and overconfidence among households, companies and financial institutions
themselves that, for the foreseeable future, interest rates would remain relatively
low, liquidity relatively high, and house and other key asset prices would continue
to rise [52]. Banks and financial institutions continued to lend, underestimating the
timing and extent of any future market collapse. A herd mentality27 developed,
resulting in an irrational exuberance28 in the markets and a speculative bubble, with
the attendant risks of losses in the event of its collapse.
Systemic risk can be defined as:
“the risk that an economic shock, such as market or institutional failure, triggers
(through a panic or otherwise) either … the failure of a chain of markets or
institutions or … a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, … resulting
in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by
substantial financial market price volatility” [54].
Before the sub-prime crisis and the GFC, the United States was the world’s
largest economy on a GDP basis, and remains so. The U.S. Dollar is the world
reserve currency. It is hardly surprising that global investor confidence is largely
dependent on the state of U.S. financial markets and the health of the U.S. economy.
When U.S. house prices collapsed in the wake of the sub-prime crisis, and
financial institutions globally perceived the riskiness of other financial institutions
and companies (so-called counterparty risk) increasing, they lost confidence in each
other’s credit servicing ability, ceasing not only to continue to purchase residential
mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., but also commercial asset-backed and non-
asset-backed securities in the U.S. and elsewhere.
The network interconnectedness of bank finance globally can, in the event of a
sufficient economic shock, transmit to a broader systemic shock if a sufficient
number of banks (or sufficiently important banks) make sufficient losses that they
themselves become unable to service their debts, not only to their depositors but to
other banks. In the wake of the sub-prime crisis, the loss of confidence in the
wholesale markets had the effect of reducing the supply of inter-bank credit, which
in turn reduced the availability of credit in retail markets, and contributed to the
collapse of the real economy in the United States [55, 56].
3.6 Cross-border securitization as regulatory ‘arbitrage’
Investment opportunities may plainly expanded by not limiting securitization
arrangements to one domestic jurisdiction, but by engaging in cross-border or
26 Keynes further argued that, by its very nature, entrepreneurship must always remain partly skill and
partly chance: if human nature had no inclination to take risks, there might not be much long-term
investment.
27 A herd mentality arises when every market participant, knowing that everybody (including
themselves) has incomplete information about the value of a particular behaviour, rationally (ex-ante)
interprets others’ consistent prior choices as evidence of the value of that behaviour, and replicates
it [53].
28 Shiller R.J. (2005), Irrational Exuberance, Crown, New York.
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international securitization. Equally however, the ability to securitize across inter-
national borders creates incentives to not only ‘arbitrage’ on domestic regulation,
but to ‘arbitrage’ on an international network of legal rules.
Prior to the GFC, most securitization schemes exploited regulatory regime
inconsistences existed among jurisdictions via cross border securitization in order to
bypass the existing regulations. In order to make assets isolated from its originator,
then practice was to transfer all assets to a SPV. As a result assets will be bankruptcy
remote from its originator, which is essential for securitization to work. A SPV is a
different entity from its originator. If both the originator and the SPV are in the
same jurisdiction, they will be treated as two distinct companies and will be taxed
separately. The innovative solution cross boarder securitizer came up with is to set
up SPV in tax heavens like Cayman island to avoid U.S tax regulations. As a result,
SPV and the originator could avoid US tax regulation, by being two different
business entities while on the other hand can reap the benefits of being a separate
entity (that is isolating assets from its originator). When a SPV is setup in another
jurisdiction it could bypass the U.S Internal Revenue code of 1986, since the SPV is
not an entity engaged in U.S trade or business [57].
Banks were able to transfer their risky assets off balance sheet by transferring
them to a SVP. As a result banks were able to by-pass the need for reserves. Banks
were able to grant more loans and sell them in the same way. In this manner risk
could be shifted off-balance sheet and off shoe.
The off-balance-sheet or on-balance-sheet position of an asset depends on the
fact wheatear the asset ‘transfer’ constitutes a sale or is a loan. This is an issue to be
dealt with Accounting. Financial Accounting Standard No. 140 identifies elements
of a true sale.29 If a SPV to come under FAS 140, it will be considered a qualified
SPV and thus need not to include in sponsor’s consolidated statements.
3.7 Was pre-GFC securitization law suboptimal?
The U.S Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000 prohibited Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) regulating Over-the-counter derivatives. The justification is that CDS and
similar (over the counter) instruments are transacted by sophisticated parties who
can fend themselves and thus there is no need to safeguard such transactions by the
SEC and CFTC. Similarly, CDS were (deliberately) not considered insurance con-
tracts. Thus avoided state insurance regulations. State of New York amended the
insurance law to exclude CDOs from coverage. The justification is that CDS are
dealing with institutional investors but not consumers [4, 25].
29 1. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor—put presumptively beyond the reach
of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receivership.
2. Each transferee (or, if the transferee is qualifying special-purpose entity (SPE), each holder of its
beneficial interests) has the right to pledge or exchange the assets (or beneficial interests) it
received, and no condition both constrains the transferee (or holder) from taking advantage of its
right to pledge or exchange and provides more than a trivial benefit to the transferor.
3. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets through either (1) an
agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor to repurchase or redeem them before their
maturity or (2) the ability to unilaterally cause the holder to return specific assets, other than
through a clean-up call.
See Summary of Statement No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities-a replacement of FASB Statement No. 125 (Issued 9/00), Financial
Accounting Standards Board. Online <http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum140.shtml&pf=true>
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On one hand CDSs were not regulated as insurance enabling non-insurable
interest holders gaining protection over default of an entity, ultimately leading to
betting. On the other hand no authority was overseeing the process. As a result
when sup-prime borrowers defaulted, the loss was passed to the investor and then
to the CDS provider. Near bankruptcy of AIG is the classic example of risk transfer
from the lender to the insurer via the investor. Finally when AIG was bailout, the
loss was actually shifted to the U.S treasury in lieu of tax payer [25].
4. Summary
This chapter has sought to provide a contextual background to those that follow.
The effects of excess system liquidity and easy credit conditions, executive com-
pensation arrangements which encouraged excessive risk-taking (e.g. through
financial innovations such as loan securitization), banking and investment activity
that sought to circumvent extant regulation, and the bursting of the U.S. housing
bubble together culminated in the U.S. sub-prime crisis. Further, because many U.S.
institutions and corporates had entered into contracts (e.g. securitization contracts,
insurance/sub-insurance contracts, and credit default swaps) which spanned juris-
dictions, the effects of what would otherwise have been a primarily U.S. sub-prime
crisis were felt beyond the United States, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe.
This chapter identified and described the salient or root causes of the GFC. Law
and legal regulation create incentives and disincentives for market participants to
behave in particular ways. A desire for innovation, fuelled by high levels of system
liquidity and executive compensation arrangements that encouraged management
to undertake high levels of risk, together with a speculative bubble in the U.S.
housing market and incomplete regulation, gave rise to highly complex financial
products. In the presence of asymmetric information, this complexity gave rise to
uncertainty and incomplete contracting, which featured significant moral hazard
and adverse selection. Overconfidence in a rising market and lapses of ethical
judgement when faced with incomplete regulation resulted, with the collapse of the
U.S. housing bubble, in a loss of confidence in U.S. markets, contributing to sys-
temic risk and so-called cross-jurisdictional ‘contagion’. Whether this so-called
‘contagion’ is true contagion or mere contractual interdependence between institu-
tions in different jurisdictions, is a separate matter.
As far as policy implications are concerned, regulating asset backed securities
and associated derivatives would be a prima facie solution for the mortgage crisis.
Yet, there should be wide financial policies to prevent a similar crisis, since; next
time it would be some other asset that may create the asset bubble. Financial
intelligence units of each individual nation should extend their scope in order to
monitor developments in financial bubbles. Like in China, any innovative financial
instrument should be registered with financial intelligence units and their mecha-
nism should be analyses and measured in terms of financial safely of the innovation.
There will be no permanent solution to prevent a future for a financial crisis. All
we can (and should) do is to avoid financial bubbles that may lead to a crisis. We
never know when it would be the next crisis. Yet, we ought to know at least a few
things. We know for a fact that it would be some financial asset that will create an
asset bubble. There will be associated factors that may contribute to the creation of
the bubble. For example financial innovation, law create incentives, etc. All we got
to do is keeping an open eye on associated factors and their movements. Global
regulation such as BASEL accords can influence individual financial systems to take
necessary regulatory measures to regulate and control associated factors of a finan-
cial crisis.
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